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1 Introduction
Even before its implementation, the Basel II accord has come under fire by both
academics and politicians. The critique by academics centers on the inability of
the new accord to control aggregate risk because it neglects the endogeneity of risk
and tends to have procyclical effects (see, e. g., Dan´ıelsson, Embrechts, Goodhart,
Keating, Muennich, Renault, and Shin (2001)). In contrast, politicians are more
worried about the potential consequences of the new accord for the provision of
credit, most notably to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). This even led
to an amendment of the accord, which now has special provisions for loans to SMEs.
Our paper describes a novel channel through which the new capital regulation (Pil-
lar I of the new Basel accord) may harm especially small banks—and hence their
borrowers who tend to be small as well—, and thereby lead to an increase in aggre-
gate risk. Interestingly, this result does not follow from the implementation of the
internal ratings based (IRB) approach as such, but rather from the banks’ right to
choose between the standardized and the IRB approaches. In fact, in our model the
introduction of an IRB approach can be beneficial to small banks, if it is applied
uniformly to all banks and the fixed costs of implementation are small.
The problem arises from the implicit asymmetric treatment of small and large banks
by the new regulation: The implementation of the IRB approach requires large
initial investments in risk management technologies, which may deter small banks
from choosing the IRB approach. In that case, only large banks profit from the
reduction in capital requirements (and hence marginal costs) for safe loans in the
IRB approach. This gives them a competitive advantage compared to small banks.
In our model, this may lead to reduced market shares and higher risk-taking at the
small banks due to fiercer competition in the market for deposits, and to an increase
in aggregate risk in the economy. If small banks are specialized in extending loans
to small firms, the shrinking market shares of small banks imply a cutback in the
lending to these borrowers, especially to the more creditworthy ones among them.1
There exists by now a large literature on the new Basel Accord. Most empirical pa-
pers (too many to be reviewed here) deal with the question whether the new accord
assigns the correct risk weights to different risk groups. We will abstract from this
issue here by assuming that the risk weight functions are “correct.” Several theo-
retical papers deal with the potentially adverse macroeconomic effects of Basel II,
especially with its procyclicality and its neglect of the endogeneity of financial risk
(see, e. g., Lowe (2002), Kashyap and Stein (2004), and Dan´ıelsson, Shin, and Zi-
grand (2004)). Similar to those papers, we are interested in the implications of the
new accord for the aggregate risk in the economy (but in a static setup). A paper
1It is now widely accepted that small banks have a competitive advantage in extending relation-
ship loans based on soft information to opaque borrowers, whereas large banks have an advantage
in granting loans based on hard information to transparent borrowers. See Berger and Udell (2002)
and Stein (2002) for theoretical arguments, and Haynes, Ou, and Berney (1999), Berger, Miller,
Petersen, Rajan, and Stein (2002), Carter and McNulty (2004), and Cole, Goldberg, and White
(2004) for empirical evidence using U. S. data.
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by Decamps, Rochet, and Roger (2004) is the only one to analyze the interactions
between the three pillars of the new accord. In contrast, we focus on pillar I, the
new capital regulation.
The papers most closely related to ours are the ones by Rime (2003) and Repullo and
Suarez (2004) who analyze the implications of the co-existence of the standardized
and the IRB approaches for banks’ risk choices. Both papers argue that banks
eligible for the IRB approach have a competitive advantage in the provision of low-
risk loans (due to the lower capital requirement in the IRB approach), while the
less sophisticated banks have a competitive advantage in the provision of high-risk
loans (where the capital requirement is lower in the standardized approach). This
situation leads to a sorting of borrowers in the sense that high risks tend to be
financed by unsophisticated banks, and low risks by sophisticated banks.2
Our paper makes a different, and complementary, point by starting from a setup that
differs from those of Rime and Repullo and Suarez in several important respects.
First, there are no moral hazard effects in their models. Their results are entirely
driven by the cost differentials from the two regulatory approaches. In our model, we
emphasize moral hazard effects because we believe that one of the main purposes
of capital requirements is the provision of incentives for prudent bank behavior.
Second, the other two papers model bank competition in the loan market, and
ignore competition on the liabilities side. In both models, it is crucial that borrowers
are actually able to switch between banks. In contrast, we model competition on
the liabilities side of banks’ balance sheets, and ignore competition for loans by
assuming that banks serve different clienteles in their loan business. The large
empirical literature on relationship versus transactions loans, cited above, suggests
that such an assumption is appropriate for the case relevant in our model, namely
the competition between large and small banks. In a context similar to ours, Berger
(2004) presents additional empirical evidence on this phenomenon. We assume,
however, that large and small banks draw from a similar pool of deposits or other
refinancing. Finally, we also consider the effects of regulation on aggregate risk-
taking in the economy.
The purpose of our paper is not to model the effects of capital regulation as such.
This has been done, for example, by Repullo (2004) in a more sophisticated way
(see also Hellmann, Murdoch, and Stiglitz (2000)). Instead we employ a simple
framework that yields reasonable predictions on the effects of capital regulation; then
we analyze the effect of the coexistence of the standardized and the IRB approaches
in this setup. Our model assumptions are similar to the ones by Repullo. However,
there also are a number of differences: First, Repullo uses a dynamic framework to
explicitly model franchise values. Second, deposits are fully insured in his model,
but not in ours, such that deposit rates depend on the riskiness of investments in
our model. Finally, Repullo focuses on symmetric equilibria whereas we also analyze
asymmetric outcomes. It is reassuring that, in spite of the differences in modelling
2Repullo and Suarez (2004) add an interesting quantitative analysis where they simulate the
effects of Basel II on loan rates and quantify the social costs of bank failures needed to justify the
actual IRB capital requirements.
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assumptions, our model yields similar predictions on the effects of flat and risk-based
capital requirements as Repullo’s model, at least for the symmetric cases.
Another paper related to ours is by Berger (2004) who empirically assesses the
competitive effects caused by the preferential treatment of SME loans in the IRB
approach. Our theoretical idea could also be applied to this more specific issue be-
cause it also implies a difference in capital requirements (and hence marginal costs)
across different bank groups. Note, however, that our main interest is in the asym-
metric treatment of banks due to the right to choose between the standardized and
the IRB approaches, which may be quantitatively much more important than the
“carve-out” on SME loans. Consistent with our assumption above, Berger concludes
that the competitive effects in the loan market are likely to be small because large
and small banks tend to make different kinds of SME loans. However, our analysis
suggests that it may not be sufficient to consider competitive effects on the loan
market to fully assess the implications of the special provisions for SME loans.
In the next section, we describe the features of the New Basel Capital Accord that
are relevant for our theoretical model. Section 3 contains the setup of the model. In
section 4, we analyze a banking sector where all banks are regulated according to the
standardized approach. Section 5 turns to the IRB approach. We first show what
happens when all banks are required to adopt the internal ratings based approach.
Then we analyze the case where banks can choose between the standardized and
the IRB approaches. Section 6 concludes.
2 The New Basel Capital Accord
Our analysis focuses on one particular—and arguably the most important—aspect
of the New Basel Capital Accord: the enhancement of risk sensitivity of capital
requirements for credit risk.3 Instead of the broad risk categories defined in the
1988 Basel Accord, the new accord envisions that capital requirements should de-
pend directly on the debtors’ ratings, both external and internal. However, the
information requirements are so high that only a subset of banks will be able to pro-
vide the necessary information in a reliable way. Therefore, the new accord offers
banks the right to choose between a Standardized Approach and an Internal Ratings
Based (IRB) Approach.4 Within the IRB Approach, banks can opt for a Foundation
or an Advanced IRB Approach, differing with respect to the extent that internal
information is fed into the risk weight functions specified by the Accord.
As in the old accord, banks are required to have a capital ratio of at least 8 percent.
The capital ratio is defined as the regulatory capital divided by risk-weighted assets.
3A detailed description of the new accord can be found in Basel Committee on Banking Super-
vision (2004).
4A similar right to choose already existed in the old Basel accord, namely in the treatment
of market risk, where banks can choose between an internal models approach and a standardized
method. Now this is extended to the treatment of credit risk.
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The modifications in the new accord mostly affect the definitions of risk weights in
the denominator of the capital ratio. In the model, we will not distinguish between
regulatory capital and equity. Also, instead of defining risk weights, we will use the
effective capital requirements implied by such weights. For example, a risk weight
of 75 percent would translate into an effective capital requirement of 6 percent.
The Standardized Approach is very similar to the old Basel Accord. Assets are
grouped into different supervisory categories, giving rise to different risk weights.
In contrast to the old accord, the standardized approach recommends the use of
external ratings, if they exist, and specifies different risk weights for different rating
classes; in most other cases, the risk weight is 100 percent. For a large part of
corporate loans, especially to SMEs, there hardly exist any external ratings in many
countries, so the 100 percent weight applies to them (as it did in the old accord).5
Similarly, there exist no external ratings for retail exposures; however, these loans
are now subject to reduced risk weights of only 75 percent. In our model, we will
assume that no external ratings are used in case of the standardized approach. This
is similar to the simplified standardized approach (Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (2004, Annex 9)). Also, we will not distinguish between corporate and
retail exposures. Hence, the minimum capital requirement is flat with regard to
the riskiness of loans in our model. Because of the similarity of the standardized
approach and the old regulation, we will treat them as identical.
In the IRB Approach, risk weights depend directly on external and internal assess-
ments of asset risk. Banks estimate risk characteristics, such as the probability of
default, on the basis of their internal data. These estimates then serve as inputs for
the risk weight formulas specified by the Basel Committee. Retail exposures carry
much smaller risk weights than corporate exposures. In our model, we define differ-
ent capital requirements for different risk classes of assets, where the requirement for
safe assets is below, and the one for risky assets is above the flat requirement in the
standardized approach. This is in line with the objective of the Basel Committee
to broadly maintain the aggregate level of minimum capital requirements (see Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (2004, paragraph 14)). It is not clear, however,
whether this statement refers to the initial portfolio structure, or to the one after
portfolio adjustments in reaction to the new accord.
Note that both approaches contain special provisions with respect to SME lending:
First, loans to SMEs can under certain conditions be categorized as retail loans in
both approaches, benefitting from smaller capital requirements. In addition, the
IRB Approach allows for a firm-size adjustment for exposures to SMEs, which also
reduces capital requirements.6 Hence, SME lending is favored especially in the IRB
approach, which reinforces the asymmetric treatment of large and small banks in
the new accord (see Berger (2004) for an empirical analysis of this issue).
5An exception are the United States where many corporate borrowers are rated. However, the
standardized approach is not going to be implemented in the U. S., but will be replaced with the
rules from the old Basel accord.
6The illustration in the official documentation suggests that the firm-size adjustment reduces
capital requirements by 20 to 25 percent.
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Finally, the New Basel Accord contains a long list (51 paragraphs!) of minimum
requirements that a bank has to fulfill to be eligible for the IRB Approach. There-
fore, the introduction of the IRB Approach requires high fixed costs (e. g. for the
installation of a sophisticated risk management system), which may deter smaller
and less sophisticated banks from using the IRB Approach. In addition, the lack
of sufficient historical data may make the use of the IRB Approach unfeasible for
smaller banks. In both cases, small banks would not benefit from the decrease in
capital requirements for relatively safe exposures. This paper analyzes how this
asymmetric treatment of large and small banks affects banks’ risk-taking and per-
formance, as well as the aggregate risk in the economy. Note that our results do not
hinge on the specific modelling details of the regulation. The main effect is driven
by the combination of fixed costs and reduced marginal costs in the new regulation.
Our specification is meant to model these features in the simplest way.7
3 Model Setup
Banks Consider an economy with n + 1 chartered banks and no entry of new
banks. The banks have limited liability and are risk neutral. They collect deposits
and equity, and can invest these funds in one risky project. There are two types
of projects that each bank can choose from. The “safe” project yields y1 with
probability p1, and zero otherwise. The “risky” project returns y2 with probability
p2, and zero otherwise. Assume that p1 y1 > p2 y2; hence, an investment in the safe
project is efficient. Assume also that y2 > y1, so that there is scope for the typical
risk-shifting problem a` la Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
There are two types of banks, large banks (L) and small banks (S). For simplicity,
we assume that there is only one large bank. Introducing more than one large
bank would weaken the competitive position of the large bank, but would leave the
general structure of the model unchanged. The large bank competes with all small
banks for deposits, whereas the small banks compete only with the large bank, but
not with other small banks. This is to capture the idea that small banks operate in
isolated local markets where they compete with large banks maintaining a branch at
the same location, but not with small banks from other locations. Such a structure
simplifies the calculations considerably, because one can analyze each local market
separately.
There is imperfect competition in the deposit market. Specifically, the supply of
deposits takes the following form,
dL = DL + nσ (rL − rS) and dS = DS/n + σ (rS − rL). (1)
7The exact implementation of the new Basel Accord may differ across jurisdictions. In Europe
and Japan, the new accord will probably be applied to all banks in their jurisdictions. In the
United States, however, the largest banks will be required to switch to the Advanced IRB approach,
whereas all other banks may remain in the old Basel I regulation or switch to the Advanced IRB
approach. Even in such a situation, our main argument remains valid unless the largest banks
would have preferred to stick to Basel I.
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The deposit volume dj supplied to a bank of type j depends on the expected (gross)
returns for depositors, rj, relative to the expected returns of the competitor bank.
We implicitly assume that depositors are risk neutral and care about expected re-
turns only. If, for example, depositors expect a bank to invest in the safe project,
the relationship between the expected and the nominal rate is rj = p1 r
nom
j , or
equivalently rnomj = rj/p1.
DL and DS/n can be thought of as the banks’ clienteles. If two competing banks
set identical deposit rates, their supplies of deposits are just their clienteles. The
parameter σ measures depositors’ interest rate sensitivity, and hence the intensity of
competition in the deposit market. If σ is small, depositors are reluctant to switch
banks even in the presence of relatively big interest rate differentials, and banks
nearly enjoy monopolies with respect to their clienteles. If σ is large, depositors are
very sensitive to interest rates, and the deposit market is rather competitive. Note
that the aggregate supply of deposits is completely inelastic and equal to DL +DS.
Deposit rates determine only how the aggregate supply is distributed among banks;
they do not affect the aggregate supply. This means that any amount of deposits
gained by one bank must be lost by another. Without loss of generality, we set
DL + DS = 1, so that we can interpret dL and dS not only in absolute terms
(deposit volumes), but also in relative terms (market shares). Furthermore, assume
that DL > DS; the clientele of the large bank is larger than that of small banks.
The supply functions in (1) could be motivated by a model with spatial competition
a` la Hotelling (1929), with transportation costs that are inversely proportional to
σ. Because the parameters for all small banks are identical, we do not have to
distinguish between them (as long as they play pure strategies).8
In addition to deposits, banks can finance their lending activities through equity, kj.
Equity is provided by a single shareholder who demands an expected return of rk >
p1 y1. Equity finance is inefficient, but it may be used for regulatory purposes. Such
an assumption has become standard in the literature (see e. g. Hellmann, Murdoch,
and Stiglitz (2000) and Repullo (2004)). We assume that depositors cannot observe
the amount of equity taken in by their bank, so that banks cannot use their equity
as a signal for project quality.9
Capital Adequacy We analyze two different regulatory approaches.
1. The standardized approach does not distinguish between projects with different
risk levels. A fraction of at least α of a bank’s assets must be financed by equity.
8We ignore the depositors’ participation constraints. If deposit rates are low, depositors may
choose to stay at home (and save on transportation costs) rather than bring their money to the
bank. We implicitly assume that depositors have to invest their money at a bank.
9If depositors could observe kj , a bank would have an incentive to take enough equity to
convince depositors that it will take the safe project. As a consequence, there would be no reason
for banking regulation. Assuming that kj is unobservable is a consistent way to leave some scope
for regulation.
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Figure 1: Time Structure
• Banks choose regulatory approaches and announce deposit rates, rj.
• Banks first collect deposits, dj, then equity, kj. The depositors and
the shareholder anticipate the project choices of banks.
• Banks choose projects and invest.
• Projects mature. If the projects are successful, banks repay debt and
equity; otherwise, they default and repay nothing.
Hence, a bank’s balance sheet must satisfy the regulatory constraint
kj ≥ α (dj + kj),
where dj + kj is the amount invested in risky assets.
2. The internal ratings based (IRB) approach distinguishes between different risk
classes. The regulatory constraint is
kj ≥ β1 (dj + kj), (2)
if the bank chooses the safe project, and
kj ≥ β2 (dj + kj), (3)
if the bank chooses the risky project, where β2 > α > β1. This specification
implicitly assumes that the regulator can observe the riskiness of banks’ assets,
or at least that the regulator can set incentives for banks to truthfully report
the level of their risk.10 Finally, the IRB approach requires a sophisticated
internal risk management, entailing a non-monetary fixed cost of C.
Figure 1 displays the time structure of the model. In the following, we will charac-
terize the equilibria of the model under different types of capital regulation.
4 The Standardized Approach
In this section, we assume that all banks must adopt the standardized approach.
10At first sight, this assumption may seem unappealing. Why, then, does the regulator not simply
prohibit banks from taking risky projects? The reason is that risky projects are not necessarily
inefficient, and that banks are typically better than regulators in choosing the optimal risk-return
ratio of their projects. Therefore, risky projects should not be banned completely.
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4.1 Risk Choices of Banks
In this model, there is a simple decision rule concerning banks’ project choices. A
bank will choose the risky project if and only if expected returns on deposits exceed
a critical deposit rate, rcrit. If a bank collects d units of deposits and k units of
equity, it can invest d + k in risky assets. The index j is omitted when there is no
danger of confusion. If the bank offers an expected return of r, the bank’s nominal
debt amounts to d r/p1, given that depositors anticipate the bank to take the safe
project. Since equity cannot be used as a signal, regulatory constraints will always
bind, α = k/(d + k) and 1− α = d/(d + k).
If depositors anticipate the bank to choose the safe project and the shareholder
obtains a fraction δ1 of profits, the expected profits of the bank are, net of repayments
to the debt and equity holders,
Π1 = (1− δ1) p1 (y1 (d + k)− r d/p1), (4)
given that the bank chooses the safe project as anticipated by their depositors. If,
however, depositors anticipate the bank to choose the safe project and the bank opts
for the risky project, expected profits are
Π2 = (1− δ1) p2 (y2 (d + k)− r d/p1).
The critical expected return that equalizes Π1 and Π2 is
rcrit =
d + k
d
p1
p1 y1 − p2 y2
p1 − p2 =
p1
p1 − p2
p1 y1 − p2 y2
1− α . (5)
If the shareholder anticipates that the bank takes the safe project, the expected
payment to him amounts to
k rk = δ1 (p1 y1 (d + k)− r d),
yielding an expected return of rk, if the bank indeed chooses the safe project. Solving
for δ1 and substituting into (4), we get
Π1 = (d + k) p1 y1 − r d− k rk.
Considering further that k = dα/(1− α) implies
Π1 = d
(p1 y1 − α rk
1− α − r
)
.
Following the same procedure for the case of the risky project and combining the
two profit functions, we get expected profits of
Π = d
(pi yi − α rk
1− α − r
)
, (6)
with i = 1 (safe project) for r ≤ rcrit and i = 2 (risky project) for r > rcrit.
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Capital adequacy has two effects on the profitability of banks. First, for a given
project choice, it deteriorates profitability, because the bank is forced to refinance
itself through expensive equity. In general, part (but not necessarily all) of this cost
is going to be shifted to depositors in the form of reduced deposit rates. Second,
a higher α increases the critical deposit rate rcrit. If this induces a single bank to
take the efficient project where it otherwise would have chosen the inefficient one,
profitability is enhanced. In that case, the capital regulation is beneficial for the
bank because it allows the bank to commit to the safe project and thus avoid higher
refinancing costs.
4.2 Reaction Functions of Banks
We start with the analysis of a single bank (without loss of generality, the large
bank) in a specific local market. If competition is weak and deposit rates are low,
moral hazard is not a problem, and the large bank will choose the safe project. We
will establish constraints on σ afterwards. Substituting (1) into (6) yields
Π1L =
(
DL + nσ (rL − rS)
) (p1 y1 − α rk
1− α − rL
)
.
The first order condition implies
rL =
1
2
(p1 y1 − α rk
1− α + rS −
DL
nσ
)
. (7)
The bank’s expected profits are then
Π1L =
nσ
4
(p1 y1 − α rk
1− α − rS +
DL
nσ
)2
,
and its market share is
dL =
nσ
2
p1 y1 − α rk
1− α +
DL − nσ rS
2
.
When the competitor’s rate rS rises, the bank reacts by also offering higher rates
(see (7)). At some point rkinkS , it reaches the critical rate with rL = r
crit,
rkinkS = 2 r
crit +
DL
nσ
− p1 y1 − α rk
1− α .
When rS rises further, the bank does not immediately offer higher deposit rates, but
it continues to offer rcrit (hence the kinks in figure 2). Otherwise, depositors would
anticipate that the bank will choose the risky project and demand a higher default
premium. The bank’s market share is now simply dL = DL + nσ (r
crit − rS).
However, at some point rjumpS , market rates are so high that the bank prefers to raise
its rate, thereby admitting that it will take the risky project, but “regaining” some
volume. After this point, the bank sets a deposit rate of
rL =
1
2
(p2 y2 − α rk
1− α + rS −
DL
nσ
)
.
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Figure 2: Reaction Functions
rcrit
rcrit
rS
rL
rkinkS r
jump
S
rkinkL
rjumpL
Here and in the following figures, parameters are y1 = 2, p1 = 2/3, y2 = 3.5, p2 = 1/3, α = 1/10,
rk = 3/2, DL = 3, DS = 2, and σ = 3/4. The thick curve is the reaction function of the large
bank, the thin curve is that of small banks.
The nominal rate is then rL/p2. The regime switch occurs when expected profits of
the bank are equal in both regimes,
(
DL + nσ (r
crit − rS)
) (p1 y1 − α rk
1− α − r
crit
)
=
nσ
4
(p2 y2 − α rk
1− α − rS +
DL
nσ
)2
.
At the critical rjumpS , the deposit volume of the bank must jump up: An infinitesimal
increase in the deposit rate leads to a strictly positive deterioration in refinancing
conditions, hence the benefit must also be strictly positive. This can only be achieved
by a jump of expected deposit rates.
Summing up, the large bank’s reaction function is
rL =


1
2
(p1 y1 − α rk
1− α + rS −
DL
nσ
)
: rS ≤ rkinkS ,
rcrit : rkinkS < rS ≤ rjumpS ,
1
2
(p2 y2 − α rk
1− α + rS −
DL
nσ
)
: rjumpS < rS.
The reaction functions of small banks have an analogous form. Figure 2 depicts the
reaction functions of both bank types for a numerical example.
4.3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium lies at the intersection of the reaction functions. Given the geomet-
ric structure of those functions, there is at least one equilibrium. However, as is also
clear from the picture, the intersection may not be unique. For example, all banks
may take the safe project (with deposit rates below the jump) in one equilibrium,
whereas they may all take the risky project (with deposit rates above the jump) in
another equilibrium. In such cases, we pick the Pareto-superior equilibrium with
the lower deposit rates.
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Banks’ behavior can be characterized by a number of regimes, differing with respect
to the banks’ risk-taking and deposit rate policies. It depends on the intensity of
competition in which regime the banks find themselves. In our discussion, we start
from a regime with low competition (small σ) and then consider what happens if
σ is increased. Figure 3 illustrates the effects of competition on banks’ deposit
rates, volumes, profits, and on welfare. We first discuss banks’ deposit rates and
risk-taking, before turning to banks’ profits and to welfare.
Regime 1: All banks below the kink When both types of banks are below
the kink, moral hazard is not a problem, and all banks choose the safe project.
Equilibrium deposit rates are
rL =
p1 y1 − α rk
1− α −
DL
nσ
+
DL −DS
3nσ
, (8)
rS =
p1 y1 − α rk
1− α −
DS
nσ
− DL −DS
3nσ
. (9)
As equilibrium deposit volumes, we obtain
dL = DL − DL −DS
3
,
dS = DS +
DL −DS
3n
,
hence volumes do not depend on competition σ. Expected profits are
ΠL =
1
9nσ
(
2DL + DS
)2
and ΠS =
1
9nσ
(
2DS + DL
)2
.
In equilibrium, small banks set deposit rates more aggressively than large banks
(rS > rL) in order to attract market share. When competition increases (σ rises),
both types of banks increase their deposit rates.
Regime 2: Small banks above the kink At some point the small banks, of-
fering the higher rate, are going to reach the critical rate rcrit. They know that if
they raised deposit rates further, depositors would anticipate that the bank chooses
the inefficient project and demand an additional default premium. Therefore, small
banks optimally leave their rates unchanged, foregoing some market share. This
weakens competition for the large bank, who now sets a lower rate than it would
in the absence of the moral hazard problem. However, as long as its deposit rate is
below rcrit, the large bank increases its deposit rate as σ rises, albeit less strongly
than before. Formally, deposit rates are given by
rL =
1
2
(p1 y1 − α rk
1− α + r
crit − DL
nσ
)
,
rS = r
crit,
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and market shares by
dL =
DL
2
+
nσ
2
(
p1 y1 − α rk
1− α − r
crit
)
,
dS =
DL + 2DS
2n
− σ
2
(
p1 y1 − α rk
1− α − r
crit
)
.
Now the large bank grows with increasing competition, the small banks shrink.
Regime 3: All banks above the kink At some point, large banks also reach
the critical rate rcrit.11 In this case, both types of banks offer the same expected
rate
rL = rS = r
crit.
The nominal rate is also identical because all banks take the safe project. Hence no
bank can attract any customers from another bank, and deposit volumes are simply
equal to the respective clienteles,
dL = DL and dS = DS.
Regime 4: Small banks above the jump At some point, it becomes profitable
for small banks to raise deposit rates and opt for the risky project. Depositors at
these banks now anticipate the risky project. Therefore, nominal rates must jump
up to include the higher default premium. However, the small banks raise deposit
rates even further to gain market shares. The large bank sticks to the lower deposit
rate, thereby accepting a sharp decrease in its market share. So equilibrium rates
are
rL = r
crit,
rS =
1
2
(p2 y2 − α rk
1− α + r
crit − DS
nσ
)
, (10)
yielding the deposit volumes
dL =
2DL + DS
2
− nσ
2
(
p1 y1 − α rk
1− α − r
crit
)
,
dS =
DS
2n
+
σ
2
(
p1 y1 − α rk
1− α − r
crit
)
.
The increase in small banks’ deposit rates may be so large that the large bank also
finds it beneficial to raise its rate. In this case, regime 3 may directly be followed
by regime 5 (see figure 4 for an illustration).
11If small and large banks are sufficiently asymmetric (DL  DS), or if the moral hazard problem
is small (p1 y1 ≈ p2 y2), it may happen that the small banks reach rjump before the large bank
reaches rcrit. This would give rise to an additional regime. We do not explicitly treat this regime
in the paper because it does not provide any additional insights, but just makes the discussion
more cumbersome.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium Deposit Rates, Volumes, Profits, and Welfare
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Thick lines denote the large bank, thin lines the small banks. For deposits and profits, aggregate
amounts for the group of small banks are plotted. Numbers on the abscissa indicate regimes.
Regime 5: All banks above the jump Finally, even the large bank finds it
profitable to raise deposit rates sharply and signal that it will take the risky project.
From this point on, all banks take the risky project. The small banks react by
raising deposit rates as well, but not as sharply as the large bank. Therefore, the
small banks will lose some of the market share they had gained before. However,
the small banks’ rate continues to exceed the rate at the large bank.
Similar to (8) and (9), we obtain
rL =
p2 y2 − α rk
1− α −
DL
nσ
+
DL −DS
3nσ
,
rS =
p2 y2 − α rk
1− α −
DS
nσ
− DL −DS
3nσ
.
The expressions for deposit volumes and expected profits are the same as in regime 1
(but profits are much lower in this case due to higher competition and, hence, higher
deposit rates).
We now discuss how banks’ profits are affected by the different regimes (see the
bottom left panel of figure 3). In general, increasing competition decreases profits.
The reason is that banks have to offer higher interest rates to prevent their depositors
from switching to another bank. Thereby they exert a negative externality on their
competitors. In our model, this externality is very strong because of the inelastic
aggregate supply of deposits; the qualitative result would still hold if the supply of
deposits was elastic (but not perfectly).
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However, in some regimes, the moral hazard problem prevents some banks from
raising rates, which implies a drop in their market shares and profits if the competitor
bank continues to raise rates. For example, in regime 4, large banks are prevented
from offering higher rates, whereas small banks raise rates in response to higher
competition. Even though this reduces small banks’ margins, it may boost their
profits due to the gains in market shares. Hence, in regime 4, small banks may
actually profit from an increase in competition (see figure 3 for an example of this
phenomenon). In this case, the large bank’s deposit rate is a suboptimal response
to the rate of the competitor bank, and the bank’s profits decrease not only in
absolute terms, but also relatively to the small bank. If both large and small banks
are unwilling to raise rates (regime 3), an increase in σ leaves volumes, rates and
profits unaffected.
Finally, we want to analyze the effects of competition on welfare (see the bottom
right panel of figure 3). In our model, welfare consists of only two components:
the proceeds from the project, and the opportunity costs from (inefficient) equity
finance. The opportunity costs of depositors do not have to be taken into account
because they are constant, given that the aggregate deposit volume is constant.12
Interest payments are welfare-neutral. Hence, the welfare function is
W =
∑
j
[
(pj yj) dj − (rk − pj yj) kj
]
=
∑
j
dj
pj yj − α rk
1− α .
The aggregate opportunity costs from equity finance (i. e. rk α/(1− α), since DL +
DS = 1) do not depend on σ. Hence, welfare is affected through the banks’ project
choices alone. Welfare is highest (and constant) in regimes 1 to 3 when all banks
choose the safe project, and lowest (and constant) in regime 5 when all banks choose
the risky project. In regime 4, the banks choosing the risky project expand, such
that welfare decreases in this regime. Welfare jumps discretely between the regimes
3 and 4, and 4 and 5, respectively, because at that point, one type of banks switches
its entire portfolio from the safe to the risky project. Overall, welfare decreases
in competition in our model. Hence, our model yields predictions similar to the
literature on the trade-off between banking stability and competition.
4.4 The Impact of Capital Regulation
So far, we have been holding capital regulation constant. Now we ask how the banks
respond to a tightening in capital adequacy. We first consider what happens within
the regimes described in the preceding section. Then we discuss regime switches
triggered by the tightened regulation.
12The assumption of a constant aggregate deposit volume facilitates the welfare analysis sub-
stantially. However, it also limits the generality of our welfare implications as will be discussed in
the conclusion.
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In regimes 1 and 5, tightened capital adequacy leaves deposit volumes and profits
unaffected, but leads to the same decrease in deposit rates at small and large banks,
∂rL
∂α
=
∂rS
∂α
= −rk − p1 y1
(1− α)2 < 0.
This implies that the increase in the costs of equity finance is shifted entirely to
the depositors in this regime, whereas the banks’ profits are not affected by the
regulation.
If only the small banks are above the kink (regime 2), tightened capital adequacy
implies higher rates and volumes for the small banks,
∂rS
∂α
=
∂rcrit
∂α
=
p1
p1 − p2
p1 y1 − p2 y2
(1− α)2 > 0 and
∂dS
∂α
= σ
p1 (rk − p2 y2) + p2 (rk − p1 y1)
2 (p1 − p2)(1− α)2 > 0.
The reason is that an increase in α raises rcrit, thereby relaxing the constraints on
the small banks. By raising rates to the new rcrit, the small banks can attract more
deposits and may increase their profits. Given the inelastic aggregate supply of
deposits, the large bank must shrink. The effect on the large bank’s deposit rate
is ambiguous. On the one hand, the rate increase by the small banks induces the
large bank to raise its rate as well. On the other hand, the investment becomes less
profitable due to higher equity costs, which reduces competition for deposits and
induces the large bank to decrease its rate. In any case, the large bank’s profits may
fall.
When both types of banks are above the kink, but below the jump (regime 3), a
tightened regulation raises deposit rates for both types of banks,
∂rL
∂α
=
∂rS
∂α
=
∂rcrit
∂α
> 0.
As before, the rise in the critical rate relaxes the constraints on banks. However, in
this case the relaxation is not beneficial to the banks because they cannot attract
any deposits from their competitors. Volumes remain unchanged, and profits of
both types of banks decrease. The constancy of deposit volumes is a result of our
assumption that deposit volumes are constant at the aggregate level. If we relaxed
this assumption, volumes would increase in the presence of tightened regulation.13
This result is interesting because it implies that a tightening of regulation may have
an expansionary effect on the banking sector. The reason is that higher capital
adequacy attenuates the moral hazard problem.
When markets are so competitive that small banks prefer to take the risky projects
(regime 4), the effects of tightened capital regulation are the same as in regime 2,
with reversed roles. The large bank will expand at the expense of small banks; the
large bank will gain, the small banks will lose.
13However, profits may decrease even in the presence of an elastic aggregate supply of deposits.
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Figure 4: Regimes for Varying α and σ, Standardized Approach
σ
α
α¯
0.1
0
1
← 2
3
4→ 5
The numbers mark the areas of the different regimes as described in the text. The dotted horizontal
line refers to α = 0.1, the example used in the previous figures. The dashed line marks α¯ =
p1 p2 (y2 − y1)/(p1 − p2)/rk (here α¯ = 2/3), above which only regime 1 exists.
The preceding discussion suggests that a tightening of capital requirements may
lead to an expansion of one type of bank in certain cases. Of particular interest is
regime 2, where small banks may expand in the face of tightened regulation. If one
assumes that small banks are specialized in financing small and medium enterprises
(SMEs), this result implies that the financing of SMEs is not necessarily choked by
capital adequacy. In fact, the opposite may be true.
Note that in our model, a tightening of capital regulation always reduces welfare in
the absence of regime switches. The reason is that higher capital adequacy increases
the inefficiencies arising from equity finance, while leaving the aggregate level of
deposits unchanged. If the aggregate supply of deposits were very elastic, welfare
increases would be conceivable even without regime switches.
Within our model, welfare increases can only be obtained if the tightening of capital
regulation induces a regime switch, rendering banks less likely to take the risky
projects. Figure 4 illustrates this effect for a numerical example: Starting from a
regime where one or both types of banks opt for the risky project (regimes 4 or 5),
an increase in α eventually leads to a switch into a regime where both types of banks
opt for the safe project (holding competition σ constant). The following proposition
formalizes this result.14
Proposition 1 (Standardized Approach) Higher capital requirements increase
the critical levels of competition σcritS and σ
crit
L , above which small and large banks
choose the risky project, i. e. ∂σcritS /∂α > 0 and ∂σ
crit
L /∂α > 0.
Graphically, the proposition implies that the border between the area where all
banks choose the safe project (regimes 1, 2, and 3) and the remaining area (regimes 4
14The proofs of propositions and remarks are found in the Appendix.
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and 5), and the border between regimes 4 and 5 are strictly increasing (see figure 4).
In fact, it is easy to show that the same is true for all other borders.
The proposition implies that higher capital requirements reduce the range of σ,
for which at least one type of bank opts for the risky project (regimes 4 and 5).
According to the following remark, this statement can be generalized to any other
parameter of our model.
Remark 1 Higher capital requirements weakly reduce the set of parameters for
which at least one type of banks chooses the risky project.
Hence, for any parameter of our model, the range of regimes 4 and 5 shrinks in
reaction to an increase in α. The generality of this result is remarkable.
We can conclude that, in our model, the capital regulation always decreases welfare
within regimes. However, tightened regulation may increase welfare because it may
induce banks to switch from the risky to the safe project. The stricter the regulation,
the more competitive markets must be to induce banks to take risky projects. If
the net effect of higher inefficiencies from equity finance and lower risk-taking on
welfare is positive, one may say that the capital regulation achieves its goal.
5 The IRB Approach
So far, we have discussed an economy in which all banks use the standardized
approach. Now we turn to the IRB approach. We first consider what happens if all
banks must adopt the IRB approach (Section 5.1). Then we analyze the implications
of banks’ right to choose between the two approaches, as envisioned by the new Basel
accord (Section 5.2).
5.1 Compulsory IRB Approach
In this section, we assume that the IRB approach according to (2) and (3) is com-
pulsory for all banks. What are the implications of switching from the standardized
to the IRB approach? Clearly, the answer depends on whether the regulation has
become stricter or looser. We assumed above that banks need less capital if they
choose the safe project, compared to the standardized approach, and more capital
if they choose the risky project, i. e. β1 < α < β2. Note that our qualitative results
are independent of how much β1 lies below and β2 above α.
Using the same procedure as in section 4.1, we derive the critical rate r˙crit. For
distinction, we put a dot on variables that refer to the compulsory IRB approach.
Here the assumption of a single shareholder becomes crucial. It implies that the
equity investor can infer the bank’s project choice from the amount of equity that
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the bank raises. Let Π1 again denote the expected profits of a bank that chooses
the safe project as anticipated by the depositors, and Π2 the profits of a bank that
deviates by taking the risky project. We then get
Π1 = (1− δ1) p1 (y1 (d + k1)− r d/p1)− C with
k1 = δ1 p1 (y1 (d + k1)− r d/p1)/rk
if the bank takes the safe project, and
Π2 = (1− δ2) p2 (y2 (d + k2)− r d/p1)− C with
k2 = δ2 p2 (y2 (d + k2)− r d/p1)/rk
if the bank deviates, yielding
Π1 = d
(
p1 y1 − β1 rk
1− β1 − r
)
− C, and
Π2 = d
(
p2 y2 − β2 rk
1− β2 −
p2
p1
r
)
− C.
The critical deposit rate is then
r˙crit =
p1
p1 − p2
(
p1 y1 − rk
1− β1 −
p2 y2 − rk
1− β2
)
.
One can check that for β1 = β2 = α, the critical rate is the same as in the standard-
ized approach (see (5)). Comparative statics are ∂r˙crit/∂β1 < 0 and ∂r˙
crit/∂β2 > 0.
Raising β1, while holding β2 constant, lowers the relative costs of risk-shifting; rais-
ing β2, while holding β1 constant, increases them. Given our assumptions on β1 and
β2, r˙
crit is strictly larger than rcrit.15 In contrast to the standardized approach, the
critical rate also depends on the cost of equity rk, with ∂r˙
crit/∂rk > 0. Higher costs
of capital make risk-shifting less attractive. Fixed costs C are, of course, irrelevant
for the marginal analysis and for risk-shifting.
The introduction of the IRB approach has two effects: First, it decreases the capital
requirements for safe projects and increases them for risky projects. The effects
are similar to the ones from a loosened or tightened capital regulation in the stan-
dardized approach. Second, it raises the critical rate. The qualitative properties of
banks’ reaction functions are just as under the standardized approach (see figure 2).
As a result, we again have five regimes, depending on whether banks are below or
above the kinks and the jumps of their reaction functions.
We start again by describing the behavior of banks within regimes, before discussing
regime switches. If both types of banks are below the kink (regime 1), they will
15The fact that r˙crit lies above (and possibly well above) rcrit is critical for the model when
we introduce the right to choose between different regulatory approaches. If, for example, banks’
deposit rates are constrained by rcrit (as in regime 3), they have an incentive to implement the
IRB approach in order to overcome this constraint and raise rates, but not farther than r˙crit.
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Figure 5: Equilibrium Deposit Rates and Regime Switches, IRB Approach
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In the left panel, the thick line denotes the large bank, the thin line the small banks. Dotted
vertical lines mark the regime switches in the standardized approach; the dotted horizontal line is
the critical rate in the standardized approach. The right panel plots the critical σ’s of the regime
switches for varying ∆β = β2 − β1. Here, we assume that β1 and β2 lie symmetrically around α.
The dotted line refers to the parameter constellation of the left panel. The dashed line marks the
maximal differentiation ∆β = 2α.
offer higher deposit rates. Lower capital requirements make the investment more
profitable, hence the competition for deposits becomes more severe. The opposite
is true when all banks are above the jump (regime 5). Here, because both types of
bank take the risky project, capital adequacy is tightened, and deposit rates drop.
In regime 2, all banks raise their rates. Small banks raise their rates because the
increase in the critical rate (from rcrit to r˙crit) relaxes the constraints on their deposit
rate policies. The large bank also raises its rate, first, because the small banks raise
their rates, and second, because investing becomes more profitable. However, the in-
crease of the large bank is less pronounced than that of the small banks. This allows
the small banks to “recapture” some market share from the large bank. Remark-
ably, this may even lead to increased profits at the small banks, implying that small
banks may benefit from a transition from the standardized to the compulsory IRB
approach. In contrast, the large bank shrinks, and its profits are always decreased
compared to the standardized approach. These results are interesting because they
appear to contradict the conventional wisdom that small borrowers are bound to
suffer from the IRB approach. We see that small banks may actually gain relative
to large banks from implementing the IRB approach. If we believe that small banks
serve primarily small borrowers, our results suggest that the IRB approach may
actually have an expansionary effect on SME borrowing.
In regime 3, all banks raise rates after the transition to the IRB approach because
of the increase in the critical rate. This results in lower profits for both bank types.
Finally, in regime 4, the large bank raises its rate because of the increase in the
critical rate. The reaction of small banks is ambiguous. On the one hand, they
want to raise rates in reaction to the large bank’s rate increase. On the other hand,
they want to cut rates because they are subject to a stricter capital requirement,
β2, rendering investment less attractive.
As before, we are interested most in whether the transition from the standardized
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to the IRB approach can deter banks from choosing the risky project. Figure 5
presents a numerical example. The left panel shows equilibrium deposit rates in
the IRB approach for different levels of competition. For comparison, it also shows
the levels of competition at which regime switches occurred in the standardized
approach. Apparently, all regime switches move towards more competition. In the
right panel, the critical σ’s of the regime switches are plotted for varying ∆β =
β2 − β1, measuring the degree of differentiation by the IRB approach. The thick
curve denotes the critical σ, above which at least one bank type chooses the risky
project. The curve increases monotonically. Similarly, the border between regimes 4
and 5 increases monotonically. Hence, the more the IRB approach differentiates
among risks, the more competitive markets must be to induce banks to choose the
risky project. The following proposition states that these results are true for any
parameter constellation. As before, the other borders increase as well. The proofs
are analogous.
Proposition 2 (Compulsory IRB Approach) A transition from the standard-
ized to a compulsory IRB approach increases the critical levels of competition σcritS
and σcritL , above which small and large banks choose the risky project,
i. e. ∂σcritS /∂∆β > 0 and ∂σ
crit
L /∂∆β > 0.
Because switching to the risky project is more costly than under the standardized
approach, both types will start to raise the rates (and signal that they will take the
risky project) at a more competitive stage. Similar to the statement in remark 1, the
transition from the standardized to a compulsory IRB approach weakly reduces the
set of (any) parameters for which at least one type of bank takes the risky project.
Let us discuss the effects of the transition on welfare. Within the regimes, welfare
is increased relative to the standardized approach if banks choose the safe project
(regimes 1 to 3) because capital requirements are reduced. The opposite is true when
both banks take the risky project (regime 5). In regime 4, the effect is ambiguous
because capital requirements increase for one bank, but decrease for the other. In
addition, welfare is increased relative to the standardized approach because the
IRB approach is better at deterring banks from choosing the risky project than the
standardized approach. However, banks have to incur fixed costs C under the IRB
approach, which reduces welfare. In fact, these fixed costs may be so high that some
banks are driven out of business. In our model, this would actually increase welfare,
as long as the large bank stays in business.16
If the regulation is designed in a way that induces all bank types to opt for the safe
project, and if fixed costs are not too high, the IRB approach is superior to the
standardized approach in terms of welfare because it economizes on capital. Hence,
we can conclude that the compulsory transition from the standardized to the IRB
approach achieves its goal as long as the fixed costs C are not too high.
16The reason for this result is that there are no deadweight losses from monopolization, because
the aggregate level of deposits is constant.
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5.2 The Right to Choose
In the preceding section, we assumed that all banks have to adopt the IRB approach.
However, the new Basel accord does not make such a prescription. Instead it allows
banks to choose between the standardized and the IRB approaches. We will see
that this right to choose fundamentally changes our assessment of the regulation.
Banks will opt for the IRB approach if this increases their profits, given the regu-
latory approaches and deposit rates of their competitor banks. If fixed costs C are
so high that neither small nor large banks choose the IRB approach, we are back in
the case of section 4. The regulatory amendment is then irrelevant. If fixed costs
C are so low that all bank types opt for the IRB approach, we are back in the case
of section 5.1. The interesting case is the intermediate situation where switching to
the IRB approach is profitable only for the large bank.17
Since small banks stick to the standardized approach, their capital requirement is
α. For the large bank, the requirement is reduced to β1 because the large bank
never chooses the risky project. If it did, regulation would become stricter because
of the IRB approach; hence the investment C could not be profitable. As a result,
competition must be relatively low. Furthermore, the IRB approach will allow the
large bank to offer higher deposit rates. If the large bank has not yet reached
the critical deposit rate, it will raise rates because the investment becomes more
profitable. If it has reached the critical rate, it will raise rates because the critical
rate rises. In both cases, competition for small banks increases.
Let us consider first what happens within the regimes. We put double dots on
parameters that refer to the optional IRB approach. Note that regime 5 does not
need to be considered here because it would imply that the large bank takes the
risky project, rendering the choice of the IRB approach unprofitable.
In regime 1, equilibrium deposit rates are
r¨L = rL +
2 (α− β1) (rk − p1 y1)
3 (1− α) (1− β1) ,
r¨S = rS +
(α− β1) (rk − p1 y1)
3 (1− α) (1− β1) ,
yielding deposit volumes of
d¨L = dL +
nσ
3
(α− β1) (rk − p1 y1)
3 (1− α) (1− β1) ,
17The set of possible parameter settings is not empty: If C were negligible, all banks would
(individually) benefit from switching to the IRB approach, except for the case in which they
would take the risky project even after a switch to IRB. Now because of the assumed structure
of competition, if we set σ ∼ 1/n, the large bank’s profits are independent of n, whereas the
small banks’ profits are inversely proportional to n. Therefore, for each C (and other parameters
of the model), we must only choose n large enough to render the IRB approach unprofitable for
small banks. Only for very high competition (large σ), no bank takes the IRB approach even for
vanishing C. Because of immense competition, all banks will take risky projects anyway, so they
would hurt themselves by opting for the IRB.
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d¨S = dS − σ
3
(α− β1) (rk − p1 y1)
3 (1− α) (1− β1) .
Hence in regime 1, deposit rates of all banks rise. The large bank raises its rate
because investment becomes more profitable, and the small banks raise their rates
in reaction to the large bank. However, the rate increase of the large bank is much
larger, such that the large bank increases its market share at the expense of the
small banks. The large bank’s profits increase, those of the small banks decrease.
In regime 2, small banks have reached the critical rate. Because rcrit is independent
of competition, we have rS = r
crit, as defined in (5). The switch to the IRB approach
induces the large bank to increase its deposit rate. Because the rates of small banks
are constrained, small banks shrink, and the large bank grows. Profits of small
banks decrease, whereas those of the large bank increase.
In regime 3, deposit rates were rS = rL = r
crit (as defined in (5)) when both types
of banks were using the standardized approach. Now rL goes up to r˙
crit. As a
consequence, the large bank gains market share, whereas small banks loose market
share. Again the profits of the small banks decrease, whereas those of the large bank
increase.
In regime 4, the large bank’s deposit rate rises to r˙crit. The rates of the small banks
are as in (10), replacing rcrit by r˙crit. Hence, deposit rates of all banks rise. However,
the large bank’s rate rises more strongly, increasing the large bank’s market share.
As before, the profits of the large bank go up, those of small banks drop.
The discussion shows that, within each regime, a switch of the large bank from the
standardized to the IRB approach reduces the small banks’ volumes and profits. In
contrast, the large bank benefits in all regimes from the right to choose between
regulatory approaches.
So far, we have only considered changes within the regimes. Additionally, a regime
change may occur when the large bank switches to the IRB approach. This is
particularly problematic if small banks now switch to the risky project, i. e. the
regime switches from 3 to 4. Such a regime switch would increase aggregate risk in
the economy, and market rates would jump up.18 The following proposition shows
that the transition to an optional IRB approach may indeed lead to a switch from
a regime without risk-taking (regimes 1, 2, or 3) to one with risk-taking (regime 4).
Proposition 3 (Optional IRB Approach) Given that only the large bank
switches to the IRB approach, a transition from the standardized to an optional IRB
approach decreases the critical level of competition σcritS , above which small banks
choose the risky project, i. e. ∂σcritS /∂∆β < 0.
18It is not possible that the regime switches to 5, i. e. that the large bank also takes the risky
project in reaction to the jump in deposit rates. Banks choose the regulatory approach and the
deposit rates at the same time. If the large bank sets rates above the critical rate (and hence plans
to take the risky project), it cannot be profit-maximizing to implement the IRB approach.
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Figure 6: Equilibrium Deposit Rates and Regime Switches, Right to Choose
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Curves are as in figure 5. The important difference is that the thick line in the right panel falls
monotonically if banks are allowed to choose between the approaches. The area of regime 5 is
plotted in gray because it cannot occur here: if the large bank chose the risky project, it would
not have adopted the IRB approach in the first place.
Hence, rather than deterring banks from risk-taking, the optional IRB approach may
lead to higher risk-taking of small banks. The reason is that, under the optional
IRB approach, only the large bank benefits from lower capital requirements, and
hence marginal costs. This induces the large bank to expand and increase deposit
rates, putting the small banks under competitive pressure. In reaction, the small
banks raise deposit rates to regain part of their customer base, and take the risky
project. This also translates into an increase in aggregate risk in the economy, given
that the large bank always chooses the safe project.
The proposition is illustrated in figure 6. The left panel displays equilibrium deposit
rates if there is a right to choose between the two approaches. We see that the border
between regimes 3 and 4 actually moves towards lower competition, compared to
the standardized approach, implying that risk-taking is increased by the regulation.
At the former border between regimes 3 and 4, the small banks now strictly prefer
to increase rates. The same result can be found in the right panel. In contrast
to figure 5, the curve separating the regimes with and without risk-taking falls
monotonically. Hence, if banks are allowed to choose between the two approaches
and if only the large bank switches to the IRB approach, a more pronounced IRB
approach enlarges the set of parameters σ for which (small) banks take excessive
risks. Again, an analogous version of remark 1 applies.
Even in the case of a switch to regime 4, the small banks are bound to suffer. For
the purpose of illustration, consider the case where the banks are just at the border
between regimes 3 and 4 before the introduction of the optional IRB approach. Now
an infinitesimal increase in ∆β has two effects: First, it induces the small banks to
increase deposit rates discretely, which leaves their profits unchanged at the margin.
Second, it increases the large bank’s deposit rate, which unambiguously hurts the
small banks. Therefore, the small banks will lose profits even in the case of regime
switches.
Interestingly, even the large bank may suffer in the case of a regime switch. This
result may be surprising at first sight, given that the large bank should exercise
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the option for the IRB approach only if it is beneficial. However, in choosing the
approach, the large bank takes the small banks’ interest rates as given. Hence, the
possible transition from regime 3 to regime 4 is not entering the large bank’s consid-
erations. Starting again from the border between regimes 3 and 4, an infinitesimal
increase in ∆β has two effects: first, the large bank raises its rate by an infinitesimal
amount due to the increase in the critical rate; second, the small banks raise their
rates discretely because they want to gain market share. An increased market share
of the small banks implies that the profits of the large bank decrease. Hence, the
large bank’s profits may actually fall after the transition from the standardized to
the optional IRB approach.
Apart from the case just described, the large bank will always benefit from a tran-
sition from the standardized to the optional IRB approach. This yields a political
economy rationale for why certain interest groups may lobby the regulatory au-
thorities towards a highly sophisticated IRB approach. The more sophisticated the
approach, the higher the fixed costs, and the more likely it is that smaller banks
will not be willing to adopt the new approach. The potential benefits from the IRB
approach for large banks are largest when only a small number of banks switches to
the new approach. The small banks, whose interests are less well organized, suffer
from the introduction of the IRB approach because its use is only optional. However,
given the degree of sophistication of the IRB approach, an adoption by all banks is
impossible in the absence of subsidization.
In summary, we have shown that the introduction of an optional IRB approach may
induce the small banks to take higher risks, which translates into an increase in
aggregate risk, compared to the standardized approach. Therefore, the regulation
does not achieve its goal of deterring banks from risk-taking. It appears that the
advantages of the IRB approach are destroyed by the right to choose.
6 Conclusion
Our paper has presented a novel channel through which the New Basel Capital
Accord may harm small banks and lead to an increase in aggregate risk in the econ-
omy. We started from the observation that the new accord implicitly treats small
and large banks in an asymmetric way: Due to the high fixed costs from implemen-
tation, it is very likely that only large banks opt for the IRB approach. In that case,
small banks cannot benefit from the lower capital requirements for safe loans. This
distorts competition to the benefit of the larger banks whose capital requirements,
and hence marginal costs, are reduced when adopting the IRB approach. Large
banks are induced to increase deposit rates to attract more deposits and exploit
the higher profitability of investments. Fiercer competition for deposits forces small
banks to raise their deposit rates as well, to recapture some of their market shares.
At this higher rate, small banks may prefer a risky investment strategy over a safe
one. Starting from a situation where all banks choose a safe investment strategy, this
implies an increase in aggregate risk. Hence, the new accord may actually destabilize
the banking system, contrary to the regulators’ intention.
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Note that our results do not follow from the introduction of the IRB approach
as such, but rather from the implicit asymmetric treatment of banks if they are
given the right to choose between the standardized and the IRB approaches. If the
IRB approach is applied uniformly across banks, banking stability is improved as
intended. Small banks may even profit from the introduction of the IRB approach
relative to the old Basel accord.
Our model relies on three important ingredients to obtain these results: the existence
of moral hazard problems regarding the banks’ risk choices, imperfect competition
among banks, and equity that is more expensive than other sources of refinancing.
In contrast, the exact market structure is not crucial for our results. For example,
one may consider a banking system with several large banks competing with each
other. As long as they are larger than the small banks, there will still be a range
of fixed costs C so that only large banks implement the IRB approach. Marginal
costs of lending decrease for large banks, and small banks suffer because of the
fiercer competition, making a switch to riskier projects likely. Similarly, one could
allow for competition among the small banks. This would complicate the analysis
because all banks would have to be analyzed simultaneously. But it would still be
true that the decrease in marginal costs at the large bank would increase competition
for deposits at the small banks and would push them towards higher risk-taking.
Furthermore, we have modelled competition among banks as price competition a` la
Hotelling (1929). Different types of competition, such as competition in capacities
a` la Cournot, would not alter our results, as long as the banks suffer from the lower
marginal costs of their competitors.
Another simplifying assumption is that aggregate deposits are perfectly inelastic.
Generally, one would think that the aggregate supply of deposits depends on de-
posit rates. Again our main results remain valid under this alternative assumption.
In particular, the qualitative results regarding the risk-taking of banks are not af-
fected. However, the effects of competition and regulation on profits and welfare
would be slightly different because increases in deposit rates could lead to an aggre-
gate increase in deposits. This would weaken the negative externality from interest
rate increases on the competitor banks. Also the volume expansion would tend to
increase welfare, especially if the aggregate deposit supply was very elastic. All
this would leave our qualitative results unchanged. A more serious drawback of the
assumption is that it yields somewhat awkward welfare implications regarding the
optimal number of banks in the economy. It implies that there are no deadweight
losses from a monopoly, such that, in the presence of fixed costs, a monopoly would
actually be optimal. Of course, we do not want to draw such a policy conclusion
from our model.
Let us now discuss the assumptions that may be more critical for our results. We as-
sumed that banks’ risk choices are dichotomous, i. e. banks can only choose between
two projects. Therefore, an increase in risk by the small banks always translates
into an increase in aggregate risk because the large banks’ risk-taking cannot change
to the better. The overall effect on aggregate risk would be more complicated if we
allowed for continuous risk choices. Then the implementation of the IRB approach
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may induce the large banks to take smaller risks than before, exerting a countervail-
ing effect on aggregate risk-taking. In such a model, there will still be parameter
constellations for which aggregate risk-taking increases, but the opposite may also
be true. However, this caveat does not dilute the basic message of our paper. The
finding that the new capital regulation may under certain parameter constellations
lead to the opposite of what is intended is in any case alarming.
Another critical assumption concerns the modelling of bank competition. We as-
sumed that banks compete only in the deposit market, but not in the loan market.
Boyd and De Nicolo´ (2005) have shown that, in a model with loan market com-
petition, the risk-taking behavior of banks depends on whether the banks or their
borrowers are subject to the risk-shifting problem. In the latter case, our results on
risk-taking may actually be reversed. Hence our results are robust to the introduc-
tion of loan market competition only if banks face, in Boyd and De Nicolo´’s words,
a portfolio problem and not an optimal contracting problem.
Moreover, the prompt effects of changes in capital regulation on risk-taking are due
to the binding capital requirements in our model. In practice, banks tend to hold
more than the required capital. If these additional capital buffers remain constant
after the change in the capital regulation, the analysis is unchanged. However, as
has been argued by Jokivuolle and Peura (2001), the IRB approach tends to induce
a higher volatility of capital requirements, which may induce banks to increase their
buffers after switching to the IRB approach. In that case, the general benefits from
the IRB approach would be smaller, and so would the competitive distortions. But
it is also conceivable that the capital buffers decrease since the banks have more
control over how much capital they actually need. Then the effects from our model
may even be reinforced.
In reality, banks may react in a number of ways to the new regulation that are not
captured by our model. One possibility is bank mergers. The new regulation clearly
sets incentives for bank mergers, especially between small banks or between large
and small banks. In our model, the merged banks would take the safe project and
economize on capital, which would constitute a welfare improvement. Outside of our
model, there are a number of additional considerations that make this perspective
less desirable. Most importantly, the merged banks may become “too big to fail,”
which would raise new incentive problems (see Hakenes and Schnabel (2004) for a
recent theoretical treatment). Moreover, mergers may reduce competition. So far,
empirical work on the U. S. has not been able to find any indications that acquisition
activity will increase significantly after the introduction of Basel II (see Hannan and
Pilloff (2004)).
Alternatively, the small banks may react to the new regulation by cooperating with
other banks in their risk management (e. g. by establishing joint rating systems) to
save on fixed costs. Similarly, the small banks may delegate their risk management to
a third party; however, this may give rise to new incentive problems. In both cases,
small banks could operate independently, but still benefit from economies of scale.
In the context of our model, this would constitute a clear welfare improvement,
and it would avoid many of the disadvantages of bank mergers. However, such
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solutions will only be possible if the regulators are willing to accept or even promote
data pooling initiatives, which would allow smaller banks to overcome the problem
of lacking historical data. Furthermore, legal restrictions (stemming, for example,
from bank secrecy laws) may prevent banks from exchanging sensitive information
about their customers with other banks or intermediaries.
Our results have important implications for the provision of loans to SMEs after the
implementation of the new accord. If we believe that small firms are more likely to
borrow from small banks, our model predicts not only a decrease in bank lending
to SMEs, but also a shift from SMEs with safer projects to those with riskier ones.
Hence, the SMEs with the most efficient projects are bound to loose the most. This
effect may be mitigated by the preferential treatment of loans to SMEs in the IRB
approach, which may induce some of the safer SMEs to switch to larger banks.
However, the large banks may not be prepared to extend loans based primarily on
soft information (see Stein (2002) for a theoretical treatment, and Berger (2004) for
empirical evidence). In addition, the unequal treatment of small and large banks
may be of concern for equity reasons.
In principle, the adverse effects of the new Basel accord described in this paper
can be mitigated in three ways: first, by lowering the fixed costs of implementation
for the IRB approach; second, by subsidizing the small banks to adopt the IRB
approach; and third, by enabling smaller banks to exploit the existing economies
of scale through cooperation or the use of intermediaries. A lowering of fixed costs
may be difficult to obtain without changing the accord, and without compromising
the reliability of the banks’ rating systems. A subsidization through public funds is
unlikely to occur. However, the lower capital requirements for good projects under
the IRB approach may be seen as an implicit subsidy to induce banks to adopt
the approach. But we suspect that this subsidy may not be sufficient to make a
switch profitable for smaller banks. Therefore, the third solution seems to be easiest
to implement. It only requires to lay the legal foundations for the pooling and
exchange of internal bank data. It remains to be seen whether such a proposal will
be able to gain political support. We argued above that the new accord may itself
be seen as a manifestation of regulatory capture by the large banks who appear to
be the overall winners of the new regulation. They may not want to give up their
privileges easily.
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: We consider the border between regions 1 ∪ 2 ∪ 3 and
4 ∪ 5 (the proof for the border between regimes 4 and 5 proceeds analogously). At
the border, σ = σcritS is such that small banks are just indifferent between the safe
project (and the critical rate rcrit) and the risky project (and a rate above rcrit). The
large bank’s interest rate is rcrit in both cases. Expected profits of small banks are
ΠReg. 3S =
(DS
n
+ σ (rcrit − rcrit)
)(p1 y1 − α rk
1− α − r
crit
)
=
DS
n
(p1 y1 − α rk
1− α − r
crit
)
,
ΠReg. 4S =
(DS
n
+ σ (rS − rcrit)
)(p1 y1 − α rk
1− α − r
crit
)
=
1
4σ
(
DS
n
+ σ
[p2 y2 − α rk
1− α − r
crit
])2
.
The function σcritS (α) is defined by Π
Reg. 3
S = Π
Reg. 4
S . Solving for σ, we get
σcritS =
(p1 − p2) (1− α)DS/n(√
A−√B)2 with
A = (p1 − p2) (p1 y1 − p2 y2) and
B = p1 p2 (y2 − y1)− (p1 − p2)α rk.
Clearly, σcritS is always nonnegative, and it goes to infinity if A = B, hence if
α = α∞ :=
p21 y1 − 2 p1 p2 y2 + p22 y2
(p2 − p1) rk .
For larger α, the algebraical solution is economically meaningless. This can be seen
from figure 4, where the thick curve is the inverse of σcritS as a function of α. As
α → α∞, the curve goes to infinity. If the thick curve reappeared in the plot from
the right, the curve would have to cross the borders between regimes 1, 2 and 3,
which does not make sense economically.
Hence the proof is complete if we can show that the slope of σcritS does not change
its sign between zero and the pole. One can show that the derivative of σcritS with
regard to α is never equal to zero. Consequently, σcritS rises monotonously in α, until
it reaches the pole at α∞. 
Proof of Remark 1: Proposition 1 refers only to the parameter σ. The remark
implies that a similar statement applies to all other parameters. Only for σ ≤ σcritS ,
all banks take the safe project. Therefore, the monotonic increase in σcritS (α) means
that the set of σ’s where all banks take the safe project grows for rising α, given
the other parameters. More formally, let P summarize all exogenous parameters
except σ and α, and let S denote the set of parameters where all banks take the
safe project in equilibrium. Then, proposition 1 implies that
(α1,P, σ) ∈ S =⇒ (α2,P, σ) ∈ S for α2 > α1.
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This statement is symmetric with respect to all exogenous parameters. Therefore,
one can state more generally that an increase in α weakly reduces the set of (all)
parameters for which at least one type of banks chooses the risky project. An
analogous argument holds for the following propositions 2 and 3. 
Proof of Proposition 2: An increase in ∆β can be due to either a decrease
in β1 or an increase in β2, or both. Hence, to show that dσ
crit
S /d∆β > 0, it is
sufficient to show that dσcritS /dβ1 < 0 and dσ
crit
S /dβ2 > 0. We present the proof for
dσcritS /dβ2 > 0, that for dσ
crit
S /dβ1 < 0 is analogous.
The switch between regimes 3 and 4 is again defined by the indifference of small
banks between safe and risky projects (the proof for the borders between regimes 4
and 5 proceeds analogously), hence
ΠReg. 3S =
DS
n
(p1 y1 − β1 rk
1− β1 − r˙
crit
)
− C !=
ΠReg. 4S =
1
4σcritS
(DS
n
+ σcritS
(p2 y2 − β2 rk
1− β2 − r˙
crit
))2 − C.
This equality defines an implicit relation σcritS (β2). Because σ
crit
S depends also on
r˙crit, which in turn depends on β2, one can write
dσcritS
dβ2
=
∂σcritS
∂β2
+
∂σcritS
∂r˙crit
∂r˙crit
∂β2
.
As stated in the main text, ∂r˙crit/∂β2 > 0. Therefore, it remains to show that
∂σcritS /∂β2 > 0 (a rise in β2 leads to a rise in σ
crit
S if r˙
crit is held constant) and
∂σcritS /∂r˙
crit > 0 (a rise in r˙crit leads to a rise in σcritS if β2 is kept constant).
We first show that ∂σcritS /∂β2 > 0, treating r˙
crit as a constant. The implicit function
theorem yields
∂σcritS
∂β2
= − ∂Π
Reg. 3
S /∂β2 − ∂ΠReg. 4S /∂β2
∂ΠReg. 3S /∂σ
crit
S − ∂ΠReg. 4S /∂σcritS
= − ∂Π
Reg. 4
S /∂β2
∂ΠReg. 4S /∂σ
crit
S
.
ΠReg. 4S decreases in β2 because Π
Reg. 4
S rises in Φ :=
p2 y2−β2 rk
1−β2 − r˙crit, which in turn
decreases in β2 (because rk > p2 y2). Furthermore, Π
Reg. 4
S increases in σ
crit
S (because
it increases in σ, for constant r˙crit). Otherwise, it could not have been optimal for
the small banks to choose r˙crit for σ below σcritS . This proves that ∂σ
crit
S /∂β2 > 0.
Now we show that ∂σcritS /∂r˙
crit > 0. Using again the implicit function theorem,
∂σcritS
∂r˙crit
= − ∂Π
Reg. 3
S /∂r˙
crit − ∂ΠReg. 4S /∂r˙crit
∂ΠReg. 3S /∂σ
crit
S − ∂ΠReg. 4S /∂σcritS
=
∂ΠReg. 3S /∂r˙
crit − ∂ΠReg. 4S /∂r˙crit
∂ΠReg. 4S /∂σ
crit
S
.
∂ΠReg. 3S /∂r˙
crit = −DS/n and ∂ΠReg. 4S /∂r˙crit = −(DS/n+ΦσcritS )/2 with Φ as defined
above, hence ∂ΠReg. 3S /∂r˙
crit − ∂ΠReg. 4S /∂r˙crit = −(DS/n− ΦσcritS )/2. Furthermore,
∂ΠReg. 4S /∂σ
crit
S =
Φ
2σcritS
(DS
n
+ ΦσcritS
)
− 1
4σcritS
2
(DS
n
+ ΦσcritS
)2
.
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Figure 7: Reaction Functions Near the Critical α
rS
rL
Thin lines are reaction functions by small banks, thick lines those of large banks. Black lines
denote the standardized approach, gray lines the IRB approach. Here, parameters are such that
the kinks occur for negative deposit rates.
This term is equal to zero for Φ = DS
nσcritS
(the other zero is for negative Φ). For
smaller Φ, the term is negative, for larger Φ, it is positive. For smaller Φ, the term
∂ΠReg. 3S /∂r˙
crit − ∂ΠReg. 4S /∂r˙crit from above is also negative, and vice versa. As a
result, numerator and denominator of ∂σcritS /∂r˙
crit always have the same signs. This
proves that ∂σcritS /∂r˙
crit > 0, and completes the proof of the proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 3: For the proof, we build on the intuition delivered by
figure 7. Black curves denote the reaction functions of small and large banks under
the old regulatory framework, i. e. all banks use the standardized approach. Assume
that α is such that the equilibrium is close to the border between regimes 3 and 4.
In other words, in equilibrium, small banks are individually indifferent between the
critical deposit rate rcrit and a higher rate (which would signal the risky project).
We want to argue that an increase in ∆β then leads to a switch to regime 4. In
figure 7, the equilibrium is given by the white dot to the left. Here, indeed, the
equilibrium rL is low enough to ensure that small banks offer r
crit and take the safe
project. Also the large bank offers rcrit. However, it has some “reserves”: Even if
small banks raised deposit rates, the large bank would not react by raising rates, too
(in the figure, the reaction function of the large bank “overlaps” the critical point).
We assumed that a switch to the IRB approach is profitable only for the large bank.
As a result, the large bank implements the IRB approach, and the critical deposit
rate for the large bank goes up from rcrit to r˙crit. The large bank raises deposit rates.
Consequently, small banks now prefer offering a higher deposit rate (and signalling
the risky project). Before the introduction of the IRB approach, all banks took the
safe project, now all small banks take the risky project. Aggregate volume remains
unchanged, hence aggregate risk in the economy has gone up.
There are two reasons why small banks may be indifferent between rcrit and a higher
rate, but the situation may still be different from that in figure 7. First, small and
large banks may be so asymmetric that, at the indifference point of small banks,
the large bank offers a rate below rcrit (regime 2). Taking the derivative of (7) with
respect to α, one proves that for given rS, deposit rates of the large bank rise if
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regulation for large banks softens. As before, this induces the small banks to raise
rates and pick the risky project.
Second, banks may be so symmetric, and the IRB approach so close to the stan-
dardized approach (β1 ≈ α ≈ β2), that the introduction of the IRB approach at
the large bank and the ensuing upward-jump of market rates would also induce the
large bank to take the risky project. This, as already discussed, leads to a contra-
diction, because large banks would not have implemented the IRB approach in the
first place. 
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